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Abstract
This study reports theory-testing laboratory experiments on the eﬀect of yardstick
competition on corruption. On the incumbent side, yardstick competition acts as a
corruption-taming mechanism if the incumbent politician is female. On the voter
side, voters focus on the diﬀerence between the tax rate in their own jurisdiction
and that in another. If the tax rate is deemed unfair compared to the one in an-
other jurisdiction, voters re-elect less. The ﬁndings support the claim by Besley and
Case (1995) that incumbent behavior and tax setting are tied together through the
nexus of yardstick competition. This renders generalizability to these laboratory
experiments and addresses some concerns raised by Levitt and List (2007).
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According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
the Nigerian President recently estimated the total cost of corruption at a
quarter of Africa’s total income. 1 Nigeria is not alone. As suggested by Trans-
parency International’s indices, many countries are coping with this problem-
atic phenomenon. 2 Like other forms of economic behavior, corrupt behavior
can be seen as the result of an interaction between an agent’s environment and
the institution in which such agent makes decisions. 3 Thus, it is interesting
to study how institutions aﬀect corrupt behavior. The nature and causes of
corruption have been studied in many contexts. 4 Recently, economists have
become interested in almost self-correcting mechanisms for political corrup-
tion that fall under the category of ﬁscal decentralization (e.g. Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2005). This study addresses the eﬃcacy of one such mechanism;
namely, whether an experimental institution with yardstick competition has
an eﬀect on incumbent and voter behavior and if so, in what direction. The-
oretically, the link between yardstick competition and corruption has been
addressed in several studies including Besley and Smart (2007) and Belle-
ﬂamme and Hindriks (2005). Empirically, the link between yardstick competi-
tion and corruption has been addressed using ﬁeld data, e.g. Besley and Case
(1995), Dincer et al. (2006) and Jonhson (2006). Experimentally, as reviewed
by Abbink (2005a) and Dusek et al. (2005), no studies have addressed this
question. 5 This study thus forms a contribution in the following ways. First,
it provides experimental evidence on the eﬀect of yardstick competition on in-
cumbent and voter behavior and welfare. In other words, we study the eﬃcacy
of yardstick competition as a mechanism, e.g. Shleifer (1985) and Holmstrom
1 The World Bank (1997) deﬁnes corruption as: ”The abuse of public oﬃce for
private gain.” Jain (2001) proposes a similar deﬁnition.
2 Corruption is termed problematic because there is generally widespread consensus
among (social) scientists across many disciplines that corruption is costly to society,
since it hinders economic growth and thus promotes poverty and income inequality.
See for example Mauro (1995).
3 There are many ways to deﬁne the terms environment and institution. This paper
adopts deﬁnitions proposed by Smith (1989). The environment consists of the collec-
tion of all agents’ characteristics; that is, tastes and technology, which in traditional
economics are represented by utility or preference functions, resource endowments
and production or cost functions. The institution deﬁnes the language (messages
or actions) of communication. The institution also speciﬁes the order in which eco-
nomics agents move, or that there is no form (moves are free form), and the rules
under which messages become contracts and thus allocations.
4 Some general survey pieces include Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2007), Aidt (2003),
Tanzi (1998) and Bardhan (1997).
5 Potters et al. (2004) experimentally address the question of collusion under yard-
stick competition.
2(1982). This is relevant both in economics (public economics, industrial orga-
nization, mechanism design etc.) and in other ﬁelds such as political science.
Secondly, we address internal versus external validity of yardstick competition
as a mechanism by comparing the results of this study with the seminal study
by Besley and Case (1995). This gets to issues of generalizability as discussed
in Levitt and List (2007). Third, by conducting a theory-testing experiment,
we are able to identify a key area in which the theory can be improved to
capture baseline agent behavior. Finally, the study contributes to the experi-
mental literature on signaling. This includes studies on (1) the plausibility of
sequential equilibria in signaling games (e.g. Brandts and Holt, 2005), (2) the
lemon’s phenomenon (e.g Miller and Plott, 1985) and (3) signaling in miscel-
laneous contexts including voluntary contributions (e.g. Potters et al., 2007),
reputation building (Grosskopf and Sarin, 2006) and board composition and
behavior (e.g. Gillette et al., 2003). The main ﬁndings are the following. The
study ﬁnds strong evidence of yardstick competition. On the incumbent side,
yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism if the incum-
bent politician is female. Also, yardstick competition makes incumbents more
aware of their choices, since beliefs matter more in the presence of yardstick
competition. On the voter side, voters focus on the diﬀerence between the tax
rate in their own jurisdiction and the tax rate in another jurisdiction when
making their re-election decisions. In particular, as the discrepancy between
the tax rates increases, voters are less likely to re-elect. This suggests that
voters use yardstick information in a speciﬁc manner; namely, the overall dif-
ference between tax rates matters. The experiments also ﬁnd some partial
eﬀects that determine corruptibility. On the incumbent side, the unit cost of
the public good matters. If the unit cost is high, incumbents are more likely to
charge low taxes. Also, gender is important when interacted with the unit cost.
Female incumbents are more likely to divert rents and charge maximum taxes
when the unit cost is high. Last, incumbents’ beliefs towards re-elections are
important. Incumbents weigh the likelihood of re-election heavily when choos-
ing tax rates. On the voter side, beliefs are captured by the tax rate, which is
a signal about the incumbent’s nature. In particular, voters re-elect more fre-
quently as taxes are lower. Also, female voters behave more consistently with
the pooling equilibrium in the Besley and Smart (2007) model. Overall, the
ﬁndings support the seminal study by Besley and Case (1995) in their claim
that incumbent behavior (i.e. vote-seeking) and tax setting are tied together
through the nexus of yardstick competition. This renders generalizability to
the ﬁndings of these laboratory experiments, addressing some of the issues
raised by Levitt and List (2007). The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. The following section discusses the design of the experiments. Then,
we turn to the main treatment eﬀects. Finally, we conclude.
32 Experimental design
2.1 The experimental game
The theoretical model that underlies the experimental design is a variant of
Besley and Smart (2007). It is a game-theoretic model of elections that is
cast in a principal-agent framework. There are two ”active” players, i.e. a
principal (the voter) and a ﬁrst agent (the ﬁrst-period incumbent) and one
”passive” player, i.e. a second agent (the challenger). An agent’s type (i) can
be good (g) or bad (b). 6 Each incumbent knows his own type; however, the
voter and the other incumbent do not. The game comprises two periods. At
the end of the ﬁrst period, there is an election. If the ﬁrst-period incumbent is
re-elected, he remains in oﬃce during the second period. On the other hand,
if the ﬁrst-period incumbent is voted out, the challenger is elected to oﬃce
during the second period. The challenger is ”passive” in the sense that he
only plays a role during elections and during the second period if elected. This
context describes a dynamic game of incomplete information. It is dynamic
because it encompasses two periods and decisions made in the ﬁrst period af-
fect outcomes in the second period. There is incomplete information, since at
least one player is uncertain about another player’s payoﬀ. Following Harsanyi
(1967), Harsanyi (1968a) and Harsanyi (1968b), the game is transformed into
a dynamic game of imperfect information by introducing moves of nature that
determine types. The baseline experimental game consists of ten repetitions
of this one-shot dynamic signaling game. Incumbent and voter subjects face
alternatives that are ”on the equilibrium path” according to the main proposi-
tion (i.e. lemma 1) derived by Besley and Smart (2007). 7 In order to minimize
repeated-game eﬀects, subjects are guaranteed that they will not interact with
the same player for more than one repetition. The following steps describe one
full repetition. In the ﬁrst period of the repetition:
(1) Nature moves and the incumbent’s type is determined to be good or bad.
(2) Nature moves again and the unit cost of public good provision (θ) is
determined to be high or low.
(3) The incumbent’s type – which is private information – is determined by
6 We maintain the deﬁnitions of good and bad types discussed by Besley and Smart
(2007). The good type always behaves non-strategically by setting rent (i.e. corrup-
tion) equal to zero. Under these circumstances, both the incumbent and the voter
achieve the same level of welfare (i.e. payoﬀs). This is also the maximum level of
welfare for the voter. On the other hand, the bad type always diverts some rent and
thus sets his own welfare (i.e. payoﬀ) above that of the voter. We maintain these
deﬁnitions in order to infer the proportions of types within the subject population.
7 Besley and Smart (2007) show existence and uniqueness of the sequential equi-
libria associated with this signaling game. See also Lockwood (2005).
4the two components (i,θ), i.e. whether he is by nature good or bad and
whether the unit cost of public good provision is by nature high or low.
(4) Having observed his type and knowing his preferences, the incumbent
chooses a payoﬀ pair from a set of alternatives. Each alternative repre-
sents a tax-public good signal (t,G).
(5) The voter observes his payoﬀ and the range of possible payoﬀs for the
incumbent.
(6) The voter re-elects the incumbent or votes him out.
In the second period of the repetition:
(1) If the incumbent is voted out, he gets a payoﬀ of zero and the challenger’s
type is determined by a lottery. 8 The result of the lottery determines the
voter’s second-period payoﬀ.
(2) If the incumbent is re-elected, he is in oﬃce again.
(3) The second-period alternatives that he chooses from are aﬀected by an-
other draw of the unit cost of the public good, determined by nature.
Payoﬀs for both players are determined by the incumbent’s choice.
(4) There is no election.
These two periods together constitute one repetition. This entire process is re-
peated ten times. To operationalize this game, some questions of experimental
design need to be addressed. First, we need to address the question whether
or not types and preferences are to be induced. Voters are allowed to behave
according their homegrown preferences, since part of what we want to learn
from conducting the experiments is how voters react to diﬀerent information
sets. On the incumbent side, the unit cost of the public good is induced,
since this is consistent with the theoretical game. Benevolence, however, is
not induced. While the primary aim of the experiment is to test a model of
corruption and yardstick competition that rests on the assumption that there
is a positive proportion of good types in the population, a secondary aim is to
test whether this assumption is empirically valid. In fact, in accordance with
parallelism to the naturally occurring world, it is sensible to ask whether this
assumption is plausible. Furthermore, since one of the questions we seek to
answer is the eﬀect of yardstick competition on incumbent behavior, it would
not make much sense to induce types. 9 Secondly, we must address param-
eterization of the experiment and how this aﬀects the experimental payoﬀ
functions. The experimental payoﬀs are derived from explicit functional forms
8 Since the challenger is a move of nature and therefore a ”passive” player in the
theoretical game, the challenger is experimentally operationalized as a lottery.
9 Allowing incumbents to behave according to their homegrown types has an im-
portant implication: Contrary to the assumption that theoretical voters know the
exact distribution of types within the incumbent population, the voters in the ex-
periment do not. In particular, voter subjects must create their own beliefs and
update accordingly as the game progresses.
5of the welfare functions discussed by Besley and Smart (2007). The bad in-
cumbent’s per-period payoﬀ function is characterized by r = t − θGθ, where
r is rent diversion (i.e. corruption), t is the tax collection, θ is the unit cost
of the public good and Gθ is the level of the public good associated with the
unit cost. The good incumbent’s per-period payoﬀ function (which is the same
as the voter’s) is characterized by W (G,t) = G − µt, where G and t are as
deﬁned previously and µ is an exogenous parameter that indexes the marginal
cost of public funds. 10 11 Finally, the following parameterizations apply to the
experimental treatments discussed below: (1) with equal probability, the unit
cost of the public good is high (θ = 2) or low (θ = 1), (2) the marginal cost of
public funds is one quarter (µ = 1
4) and (3) there are a maximum level of tax
collection of T = 4 and a minimum level of public good provision of GT = 1
associated with the experimental game. 12
2.2 Treatments
The experimental design is based on two treatments, a baseline treatment
(treatment B) and a yardstick treatment (treatment Y). Treatment B is de-
signed to capture baseline behavior and treatment Y is designed to capture
behavior in the presence of yardstick competition. The treatments diﬀer subtly
by what is observed by the voter. In treatment Y, the voter observes addi-
tional information; namely, another voter’s ﬁrst-period payoﬀ (i.e. tax rate)
10 Browning (1976) deﬁnes the marginal cost of public funds as the direct tax burden
plus the marginal welfare cost produced in acquiring the tax revenue.
11 Besley and Smart (2007) assume that the tax-cost function is strictly convex. As-
suming a linear tax-cost function has no particular complications for their results. In
particular, the good-type’s optimization problem becomes maxG [G − µθG], which
reduces to maxG [G(1 − µθ)]. If the parameter (1 − µθ) ≥ 0, then G∗ > 0. If not,
then G∗ = 0. In order to have an interior solution, we need µ and θ to satisfy the
following relation: θ ≤ 1
µ. This condition is satisﬁed in all parameterizations. A
linear tax-cost function also leaves the relationships between G and θ and G and
µ unchanged. Namely, suppose the condition θ ≤ 1
µ holds. Now, consider a slight
increase in either θ or µ such that θ becomes strictly greater than 1
µ. Then, G∗ goes
from strictly positive to zero in a discrete manner. Thus, the negative relationships
are maintained.
12 This requirement is not discussed by Besley and Smart (2007). It is introduced
here to avoid negative voter payoﬀs. By formulation of the voter’s welfare function,
if the minimum level of the public good is zero (i.e. GT = 0), the voter automatically
has negative payoﬀs when the incumbent diverts maximum rents. So, we introduce
this additional restriction in the empirical game. Suppose the minimum level of the
public good is equal to δ (i.e. GT = δ), then as long as δ satisﬁes the following
condition, existence of the sequential equilibria derived by Besley and Smart (2007)
is unaﬀected:
(1−β)T−r1




First-period alternatives faced by incumbent in treatment B
If Unit Cost is Low (θ = 1) If Unit Cost is High (θ = 2)
Alternative Payoﬀ pair Alternative Payoﬀ pair
A1 (1.50,1.50) A1 (0.75,0.75)
A2 (1.50,0.75) not applicable*
A3 (2.35,0.16) A2 (1.35,0.16)
*Notes: There is no comparable alternative.
drawn at random from the distribution of ﬁrst-period payoﬀs in the baseline
treatment. The experiments are between-subjects in the sense that any given
pair of subjects (incumbent-voter) participate in one and only one of these two
treatments. Comparisons are then made across treatments to draw conclusions
regarding treatment eﬀects. In both treatments, incumbents are faced with the
same set of potential choices. Each choice alternative represents a payoﬀ pair.
The ﬁrst component belongs to the incumbent and the second to the voter.
These payoﬀ pairs (which are summarized in table 1) are derived using the
payoﬀ functions and parameter values discussed previously. 13 If an incumbent
chooses alternative 1, we can infer that he is behaving as if he is good, since
this alternative leads to equal payoﬀs since it is based on a zero-rent behav-
ioral assumption. On the other hand, if an incumbent chooses alternative 2
when the unit cost of the public good is low, we can infer that he is playing
according to the pooling equilibrium, since he is diverting rents in a restrained
manner, in an attempt to fool the voter and gain re-election. Namely, when
the voter observes a ﬁrst-period payoﬀ of 0.75, it is uncertain whether this
payoﬀ came from a good type that got a high cost or a bad type that is facing
a low cost. Finally, if an incumbent chooses any other alternative, he is playing
according to the separating equilibrium since he is pushing the voter to the
lowest possible payoﬀs by diverting maximum rents.
2.3 Implementation
The experiments took place in the experimental laboratory at the Exper-
imental Economics Center (ExCEN) at Georgia State University. Subjects
were recruited using ExCEN’s online recruiter system, which contains names
of students taking courses in many diﬀerent areas including but not limited
to accounting, actuarial science, biology, business administration, chemistry,
economics, ﬁnance, geology, geography, mathematics, nursing, political sci-
13 The second-period payoﬀ alternatives are a subset of the ﬁrst-period alternatives;
see subject instructions.
7ence and sociology. The experiments were programmed and conducted with
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In each experiment session, half of the
subjects were incumbents and half of the subjects were voters. Each experi-
ment session had at least twenty subjects in order to guarantee that a given
politician and voter were never paired for more than one repetition. In other
words, a given politician did not interact with a given voter for more than
one repetition and vice versa. So, re-matching during the experiment was pre-
determined according to the ”two ships passing in the night” design. Subjects
were informed accordingly. Each experiment session consisted of instructions,
a ﬁve-minute trial, a quiz, a summary of the treatment, the treatment and
a post-questionnaire. The experiments lasted an average of ninety minutes.
Average payoﬀs in the baseline treatments were $15.22 for the incumbent and
$13.59 for the voter. In the yardstick treatments these were $15.25 and $13.08
respectively. Subjects were paid $5.00 for showing up, $3.00 for completing
the trial and quiz and $2.00 for completing the post-questionnaire. The proce-
dures during the experiment were as follows. Subjects were assigned a number
at sign-in. These numbers were used to randomly enter subjects into the ex-
perimental laboratory. Random entry also determined random assignment to
a ﬁxed role and diﬀerent pairs during treatment B or treatment Y. After
entering the experimental laboratory, subjects were handed paper-based in-
structions, which were read out loud by the experimenter. They were then put
through the ﬁve-minute trial. This was an opportunity for subjects to inter-
act with the software and practice making decisions that did not aﬀect their
payoﬀs. Thereafter, subjects were put through the quiz. Contrary to the trial,
the quiz was not timed. Subjects were informed that they would earn three
dollars for completing the trial and quiz regardless of how many questions
they answered correctly. They were asked to pay attention to the screens ob-
served in the trial and to the questions asked in the quiz. During the quiz, the
software informed subjects whether or not they answered a particular ques-
tion correctly. In both cases, the quiz gave an overview of the correct answer
and referred subjects to the instructions. After the quiz was completed, sub-
jects were asked whether they had any questions that they wanted clariﬁed
in private. If so, those were clariﬁed. The experimenter then summarized the
treatment. In doing so, the experimenter elaborated on the main issues and
any particular issues that seemed to be problematic based on the responses in
the quiz. The problematic issues were generally uniform across sessions. Once
this process was completed, subjects were ready to start the main treatment.
At this point, subjects were informed whether they would be Player X (a
politician) or Player Z (a voter). Subjects were told to note that the room was
divided into two ”sections” by means of a blank column of computer stations
running from front to back. This blank column divided the room into incum-
bents and voters. Everyone on one side of the room was randomly assigned to
be an incumbent and everyone on the other side was randomly assigned to be
a voter. Within each section, subjects were separated by means of dividers.
This guaranteed that they could make decisions in private. Furthermore, the
8voter side had higher dividers such that it would be impossible for a particular
voter to observe the result of the coin toss. This also reinforced the nature of
the information asymmetry in the game. Subjects were told not to communi-
cate with each other during the experiment and they were reminded that they
would keep the same role throughout the entire treatment. At the beginning
of each repetition and period within a repetition, the experimenter ﬂipped a
coin. This represented the move by nature that determined the unit cost of
the public good. The coin toss took place in front of the ﬁrst two politicians.
They observed and veriﬁed the coin toss and its result. Upon veriﬁcation, the
experimenter input the result into the computer and the respective period was
conducted. Upon conclusion of the two periods, the process was repeated until
all ten repetitions were concluded. After these repetitions, subjects completed
the post-questionnaire.
3 Results
3.1 Aggregation and demographics
A total of four experiment sessions were conducted: two B-sessions and two
Y-sessions. The main choice (endogenous) variables of interest are ﬁrst-period
choices by incumbents (this variable is named Choice) and re-election (accep-
tance) decisions by voters (this variable is named Accept). Full distribution
tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, KS and Epps-Singleton, ES) suggest that there
are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the sessions for these main
variables of interest. 14 Aggregation across experiment sessions leads to the
following number of subjects for the respective treatments: treatment B has
a total of thirty politicians and thirty voters and treatment Y has a total
of twenty eight politicians and twenty eight voters. The following descrip-
tive statistics describe the average subject proﬁle. Female subjects constitute
56.03% of the sample. The average age is 22 years with a standard deviation of
4 years. About 13% of subjects are economics majors, 12% are biology majors,
8% are accounting majors and 4% are political science majors. The remaining
subjects comprise miscellaneous majors including ﬁlm and video, sociology,
gerontology, chemistry and english. Finally, the maximum self-reported an-
nual income range is $30,001 to $60,000 with a mode annual income range of
$0 to $1,000.
14 All KS p-values are greater than 0.358. All ES p-values are greater than 0.13.
9Table 2
Incumbents’ average ﬁrst-period choices by treatment
Unit Cost Low Unit Cost High
Treatment Equalize Not Equalize Equalize Not Equalize
B 64.00% 36.00% 66.67% 33.33%
Y 58.27% 41.73% 57.52% 42.48%
Notes: NB = 30, NY = 28 and T = 10.
3.2 Average behavior
3.2.1 Incumbent and voter behavior
To get an impression of the percentage of good (i.e. not corrupt) versus bad
(i.e. corrupt) incumbents, we look at the average percentage of incumbents
that equalize ﬁrst-period payoﬀs within a treatment conditional on the draw
of the unit cost of the public good (table 2). Incumbents in treatment Y
equalize ﬁrst-period payoﬀs at similar rates regardless of the level of the unit
cost of the public good. These rates tend to be lower than in treatment B.
On average, 64% of subjects equalize ﬁrst-period payoﬀs, which suggests that
36% of incumbents are corrupt. This percentage, however, only accounts for
ﬁrst-period choices. If we want to get an estimate of the proportion of good
incumbents based on the deﬁnition proposed in the Besley and Smart (2007)
model, we must consider both ﬁrst- and second-period payoﬀs. After all, a good
incumbent is deﬁned as one who does not divert rent in either period. Table 3
shows the percentage of incumbents that behave as if bad in the second period
conditional on having behaved as if good in the ﬁrst period. According to the
deﬁnitions of types in the Besley and Smart (2007) model, these percentages
should be zero. The table shows that this is not the case. In fact, the percentage
of incumbents that equalize payoﬀs in the ﬁrst period and divert maximum
rents in the second period are relatively high (i.e. more than 50% in all cases).
These ﬁndings mitigate empirical validity of the aforementioned deﬁnitions
and indicate clear strategic behavior on the part of incumbents. We term
these choices ”theoretically inconsistent” in the context of the Besley and
Smart (2007) model, since they signal a particular type in the ﬁrst period and
a diﬀerent type in the second. It should be noted that this behavior is diﬀerent
from the pooling equilibrium derived by Besley and Smart (2007). Finally, we
turn to average voter behavior. Table 4 draws this comparison, where 1.50,
0.75 and 0.16 represent voters’ ﬁrst-period payoﬀs as discussed in table 1.
10Table 3
Theoretically inconsistent choices by treatment
Treatment Unit Cost Low Unit Cost High
B 56.94% 68.75%
Y 74.58% 71.67%
Notes: NB = 30, NY = 28 and T = 10.
Table 4
Voters’ re-election decisions
Treatment 1.50 0.75 0.16
B 61.89 19.52 11.80
Y 76.99 21.25 15.48
Notes: NB = 30, NY = 28 and T = 10.
3.3 Treatment eﬀects
This section focuses on the main treatment eﬀects. First, we specify the econo-
metric model by expressing the estimation equation and by deﬁning the vari-
ables of interest. Then, we perform estimation and inference. Three comments
are noteworthy. First, throughout the discussion we focus on random-eﬀects
(RE) estimators. This choice is mainly dictated by the fact that all covariates
of interest are individually invariant. Thus, if estimation were to occur via
FE, it would wipe out the main partial eﬀects (Wooldridge, 2002). Secondly,
a potentially relevant variable – viz. history – is not completely controlled
for in the regressions below. History of play should not be a major explana-
tory variable in our regressions, since the experiments were carefully designed
to avoid repeated-play eﬀects. Nonetheless, we might expect subjects to play
ﬁctitiously. 15 If this is the case, we should control for history accordingly.
This would require instrumental-variable (IV) estimation, since the history
of incumbents’ and voters’ choices are endogenous. Since there are no proper
instruments, we partially control for history by including (1) time and (2) the
history of the unit cost (θt−1) as explanatory variables in the regressions. The
time trend is intended to capture any upward or downward trends that may
be present in the data. The history of the unit cost acts as an imperfect proxy
for history of choices in both the incumbent and voter regressions. 16 Finally,
15 The modern game-theoretic usage of the term ”ﬁctitious play” can be diﬀerent
from the deﬁnitions ﬁrst discussed by Brown (1951) and Robinson (1951). Here we
use the term to indicate a situation in which subjects play as if they are paired with
the same player every repetition, even though they are told they are not.
16 The historical value of the unit cost is exogenous, since it is randomly determined
by the experimenter by means of a coin ﬂip. Furthermore, it directly impacts in-
cumbents’ past ﬁrst-period choices and thus it indirectly aﬀects the set of signals
11since we have designed the experiments according to a speciﬁc structure (i.e. a
logical game form), we know to a great extent the data generating processes.
In particular, since the data are generated according to a sequential game of
incomplete information by construction (i.e. by design of the experiments),
we can rule out with certainty the possibility that decisions are being made
simultaneously by the incumbent and the voter. Thus, we estimate separate
equations of interest for each treatment – one for the ﬁrst mover (the incum-
bent) and one for the second mover (the voter).
3.3.1 Incumbent Behavior
An individual incumbent’s (i) main choice variable in any given repetition (t)
is his ﬁrst-period choice, Choiceit. There are two possible ways to deﬁne this
variable. The ﬁrst is to let Choiceit be a dummy variable that is equal to one if
the incumbent chooses to equalize ﬁrst-period payoﬀs (i.e. behave as if good).
The second alternative is to let Choiceit have a range of three possible values
according to equalization, pooling or separation. We report ﬁndings based
on the ﬁrst formulation, since it lends itself to easier interpretations of the
coeﬃcients given the main question. 17 We estimate the following equation:
Choiceit = β0 + β1geni + β2θt + β3dY + β4belit + β5θt−1 + β6t+
β7I + εit,
(1)
where i = 1,...,58, t = 1,...,10, β0 represents a constant term, geni represents
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is female, θt represents
the current draw of the unit cost of the public good, dY represents a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the individual is part of the treatment group,
θt−1 is the past lag of the unit cost as a proxy for history, t is a time trend, I
is a set of interaction terms consisting of (geni ∗ θt), (geni ∗ dY), (belit ∗ dY),
(θt−1 ∗ dY), (geni ∗ θt ∗ dY) and (θt ∗ θt−1) and εit has a one-way error com-
ponent structure of the form εit = αi + νit, where αi represents a vector of
unobserved individual heterogeneities and νit satisﬁes the following strict ex-
ogeneity assumption, E (νit|Xit,αi) = 0, where Xit is the set of explanatory
variables in expression 1. We also include a proxy variable for beliefs, belit,
that were observable by the voter in the previous period. So, in this sense, the
history of the unit cost satisﬁes both the conditions for an IV or proxy variable
(Wooldridge, 2002). However, contrary to the history of incumbents’ and voters’
choices, the history of the unit cost is not individually variant. In other words, the
history of the unit cost is imperfect either as a proxy variable or as an IV. So, the
question becomes whether to use this variable as a weak instrument or as an im-
perfect proxy. We choose the latter approach, since we expect past choices to have
relatively little eﬀect on incumbent and voter behavior due to the re-pairing design
discussed previously.
17 The main treatment eﬀects are robust to the alternative formulation.
12on the right-hand side of equation 1. It is expected that when an incumbent
makes a ﬁrst-period choice, he anticipates a particular re-election decision to
follow such choice. In other words, an incumbent has some belief towards re-
election that is associated with taxes charged. This belief is likely to inﬂuence
his ﬁrst-period choice. So, beliefs can be a statistically signiﬁcant explanatory
variable in the incumbent regressions. Since beliefs are an inherent character-
istic of the incumbent, they are unobserved. Furthermore, there is no reason
to expect beliefs to be correlated with any of the other explanatory variables
in equation 1. So, the correct approach to control for beliefs is to use a proxy
variable that satisﬁes the following conditions: (1) irrelevance for explaining
the dependent variable and (2) correlation with beliefs (Wooldridge, 2002).
We claim that Acceptit (i.e. voters’ actual re-election decisions) constitutes
a valid proxy for beliefs. First, this variable satisﬁes requirement (1) since it
is chosen by the voter and thus, it should not be relevant in explaining the
incumbent’s choice. Secondly, the variable satisﬁes requirement (2) since it
is highly correlated with beliefs. This is testable. Under the assumption that
the regressors in equation 1 are exogenous and capture all other unexplained
variation in Choiceit, the least-squares residuals from the estimation of equa-
tion 1 represent consistent estimates of the error term εit and thus of beliefs.
A regression of these estimates on Acceptit ﬁnds that this variable is strongly
signiﬁcant (p-value 0.000). Table 5 reports the estimates of a linear probability
model (LPM). 18 In general, incumbents behave in a more corrupt manner in
the presence of yardstick competition; however, female incumbents are more
likely to equalize ﬁrst-period payoﬀs in the presence of yardstick competition.
Furthermore, female incumbents are less likely to equalize when the unit cost
is high. Finally, beliefs are an important determinant of incumbents’ choices.
3.3.2 Voter Behavior
An individual voter’s (i) main choice variable in any given repetition (t) is
his re-election decision, Acceptit, which is a dummy variable that is equal to
one if the voter re-elects (accepts) the incumbent. We estimate the following
equation:
Acceptit = β0 + β1geni + β2poolit + β3yardstickit + β4θt−1 + β5I + εit, (2)
where i = 1,...,28, t = 1,...,10, β0 represents a constant term, geni represents
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is female, poolit rep-
resents a dummy variable that is equal to one if the voter observes a pooling
ﬁrst-period payoﬀ, θt−1 is the past lag of the unit cost as a proxy for history,
I is an interaction term (geni ∗ poolit) and εit has a one-way error component
structure of the form εit = αi+νit, where αi represents a vector of unobserved
18 The results are robust to alternative estimation methods (i.e. logit and probit).
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Incumbent Regression (Treatment Y)






history (θt−1) -0.097 (0.441)
t -0.004 (0.523)
geni ∗ θt -0.146 (0.077)
geni ∗ dY 0.330 (0.052)
beliefsit ∗ dY 0.145 (0.049)
θt−1 ∗ dY -0.008 (0.915)
geni ∗ θt ∗ dY -0.056 (0.561)
θt ∗ θt−1 0.037 (0.618)
overall R2 0.2883
Notes: p-values in parentheses. N = 58 and T = 10.
individual heterogeneities and νit satisﬁes the following strict exogeneity as-
sumption, E (νit|Xit,αi) = 0, where Xit is the set of explanatory variables in
expression 2. There are some subtleties in equation 2. First, since the yardstick
sessions are identical to the baseline sessions except for one minor modiﬁca-
tion, the immediate question arises how to model this subtle change if we want
to compare the baseline and yardstick data. One alternative is to include a
dummy that equals one if the voter subject is in the treatment group. This
formulation leads to the conclusion that yardstick competition has no eﬀect.
Another alternative is to deﬁne a variable that takes into account the nature of
the yardstick information. In this case we are unable to collapse the data from
treatment B and treatment Y, since any yardstick variable that incorporates
the nature of the yardstick signal is undeﬁned in treatment B. In other words,
if we want to appeal to the yardstick nature of the Y-sessions by deﬁning a
yardstick variable, the above regression will be based only on data from the Y-
sessions (i.e. N = 28). So, the question we ask in this formulation is whether
the yardstick variable captures any treatment eﬀects given the assumption
that treatments B and Y are otherwise identical. This assumption is reason-
able, since the baseline and yardstick treatments were designed to be identical
except for the presence of yardstick information. So, if equation 2 controls
14for the same set of covariates as a baseline regression, the yardstick variable
should capture consistent treatment eﬀects. The second question is how to
deﬁne the yardstick variable. The ﬁndings are robust to two alternative deﬁ-
nitions. In particular, treatment eﬀects arise whether we deﬁne the yardstick
variable as (1) the diﬀerence between the tax rate in one’s own jurisdiction
and the tax rate in the other jurisdiction or (2) a dummy that equals one
if the tax rates are the same. We report results for the former. We estimate
equation 2 for three separate cases (when the signal is 1.50, 0.75 and 0.16).
Each estimation is based on a subset of repetitions, since the yardstick signal
can only take on a particular value in the ﬁrst period of any given repetition.
Table 6 reports the estimates of a linear probability model (LPM) for the
three cases. 19 The main result arising from this table is that there is strong
evidence of yardstick competition. In particular, voters pay attention to the
diﬀerence between the tax rate in another jurisdiction and their own. Fur-
thermore, any deviation from the signal that indicates that they are worse oﬀ
in comparison to the other jurisdiction is punished by voting out (rejecting)
the incumbent. To interpret the yardstick competition coeﬃcient, recall that
the yardstick variable is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the yardstick signal
and the voter’s ﬁrst-period payoﬀ. So, suppose the signal equals 1.50. Then,
the yardstick variable has a nonnegative range. In particular, the variable can
take on the values 0.00 (1.50 minus 1.50), 0.75 (1.50 minus 0.75) or 1.34 (1.50
minus 0.16). So, an increase in the yardstick variable from zero to positive au-
tomatically tells us that the ﬁrst-period payoﬀ is below the yardstick signal.
Thus a negative sign on the yardstickit coeﬃcient tells us that the voter is
more likely to vote out the incumbent when ﬁrst-period welfare is below that
of the other jurisdiction. A similar reasoning holds when the signals are 0.75
and 0.16 respectively.
3.4 Summary and related literature
The previous section discussed treatment and partial eﬀects. This section sum-
marizes these ﬁndings and relates them to previous ﬁndings by Besley and
Case (1995). We start with an overview of the main treatment eﬀects. In
general, incumbents in treatment Y behave more corruptly; however, female
incumbents in treatment Y behave less corruptly. Thus, yardstick competition
acts as a corruption-taming mechanism if the incumbent is female. Voters are
less likely to re-elect in the presence of yardstick competition conditional on
the draw. In particular, voters in treatment Y ﬁxate on the diﬀerence be-
tween the tax rate from the other jurisdiction and the tax rate in their own
jurisdiction. As this diﬀerence increases (i.e. as the voter’s own tax rate is
deemed more unfair compared to the benchmark), voters are more likely to
19 These ﬁndings are robust to alternative estimation methods (i.e. logit and probit).
15Table 6
Voter Regression (Treatment Y)
Dependent Variable: Acceptit (1=re-elect, 0=vote out)
1.50 (T = 2) 0.75 (T = 4) 0.16 (T = 4)
constant 0.889 (0.000) 0.098 (0.526) -0.136 (0.399)
geni -0.081 (0.500) 0.067 (0.593) -0.039 (0.766)
poolit 0.087 (0.685) 0.129 (0.384) 0.121 (0.255)
yardstickit -0.549 (0.000) -0.409 (0.000) -0.511 (0.000)
history (θt−1) -0.033 (0.792) 0.253 (0.004) 0.181 (0.018)
geni ∗ poolit 0.167 (0.537) 0.164 (0.393) 0.078 (0.586)
overall R2 0.4585 0.3368 0.3205
Notes: p-values in parentheses. N = 28.
vote out the incumbent. This ﬁnding is robust to an alternative deﬁnition of
the yardstick variable. This suggests that voters process yardstick information
in a speciﬁc manner by focusing on the diﬀerence between tax rates. This
ﬁnding supports Besley and Case (1995). This suggests that the ﬁndings of
these laboratory experiments do generalize to the external naturally occur-
ring environment. Finally, it should be noted that incumbents in Treatment
Y care more about beliefs than incumbents in the baseline. So, the presence
of a benchmark makes incumbents more concerned about their choice of tax
rates. In particular, the sign of the coeﬃcient (which is positive) suggests that
incumbents are more likely to choose a particular tax rate in the presence of
yardstick competition if they believe it to be associated with a higher likeli-
hood of re-election. So, even though yardstick competition does not enter on
the incumbent’s side, it aﬀects incumbent’s perspectives for re-election and
thus their choices. This gives support to the Besley and Case (1995) claim
that incumbent behavior (i.e. vote-seeking) and tax setting are tied together
through the nexus of yardstick competition. Next, we discuss to the main par-
tial eﬀects. These partial eﬀects hold overall for pooled data from the baseline
and the yardstick treatment. On the incumbent’s side, three variables aﬀect
corruptibility: (1) the unit cost, (2) gender interacted with the unit cost and
(3) beliefs. In particular, the unit cost of the public good (θ) pushes incum-
bents towards equalization when it takes on a high value. This is likely due to
the fact that incumbents have the ability to fool the voter by pooling when the
unit cost is low. When the unit cost is high, the incumbent must either equal-
ize or separate. If the incumbent chooses the latter by diverting maximum
rents and charging maximum taxes, the voter is likely to punish by voting
him out. So, an incumbent that behaves strategically and is forward-looking
would rather divert zero rents and equalize payoﬀs when the unit cost is high
in an attempt to be re-elected. Gender in combination with the unit cost is
16also signiﬁcant. When the unit cost is high, female incumbents are less likely
to equalize. This is likely because female incumbents anticipate being voted
out anyway when the unit cost is high. Namely, if the incumbent diverts zero
rent when the unit cost is high, there is a still a chance that the voter does
not re-elect, since the voter may think that the incumbent is trying to fool
him by pooling. So, female incumbents may separate at a higher rate in an-
ticipation of rejection. Finally, beliefs are important. Incumbents choose tax
rates that they believe are associated with a higher likelihood of re-election.
On the voter’s side, mainly the tax rate matters. A lower tax rate (i.e. higher
payoﬀ) is associated with a higher re-election rate.
4 Conclusion
This study reports theory-testing laboratory experiments on the eﬀect of yard-
stick competition on corruption. On the incumbent side, yardstick competition
acts as a corruption-taming mechanism if the incumbent politician is female.
Also, yardstick competition makes incumbents more aware of their choices,
since beliefs matter more in the presence of yardstick competition. On the voter
side, voters focus on the diﬀerence between the tax rate in their own juris-
diction and the tax rate in another jurisdiction when making their re-election
decisions. If the tax rate in their own jurisdiction is deemed unfair compared to
the one in another jurisdiction, voters are less likely to re-elect. This suggests
that voters use yardstick information in a speciﬁc manner; namely, the overall
diﬀerence between tax rates matters. The experiments also ﬁnd some partial
eﬀects that determine corruptibility. On the incumbent side, the unit cost of
the public good matters. If the unit cost is high, incumbents are more likely to
charge low taxes. Also, gender is important when interacted with the unit cost.
Female incumbents are more likely to divert rents and charge maximum taxes
when the unit cost is high. Last, incumbents’ beliefs towards re-elections are
important. Incumbents weigh the likelihood of re-election heavily when choos-
ing tax rates. On the voter side, beliefs are captured by the tax rate, which
is a signal about the incumbent’s nature. In particular, voters re-elect more
frequently as taxes are lower. Overall, the ﬁndings support the seminal claim
by Besley and Case (1995) that incumbent behavior (i.e. vote-seeking) and
tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition. This
renders generalizability to the ﬁndings of these laboratory experiments and
addresses some of the concerns raised by Levitt and List (2007).
175 Appendix: subject instructions
See http://viceisza.googlepages.com/SubjectInstructions.pdf . This is an active
link.
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